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Henry Ordower, Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law
A well-functioning tax system is critical to a well-functioning society but a tax system cannot
operate efficiently if it is unfair. Any tax system that does not distribute its burdens fairly will
have hostility rather than support from its taxpayers. Complexity, opportunities for some to
capture unintended tax benefits and perceptions that tax distribution is not even-handed
contribute to dissatisfaction with taxes and active tax avoidance and evasion.1 Avoidance and
evasion threaten tax systems. Constant change to control the threat characterizes many existing
systems. Much of the threat comes from the affluent. Affluent members of the society have the
mobility to take their capital and go elsewhere depriving their home country of capital resources.
They demand decrease in tax on capital as taxes on less mobile labor must increase to make up
the shortfall.
Sustainable taxation requires stability and predictability. Sustainable taxation is a tax or taxes
that collect sufficient revenue to support the governmental goods and services the society needs
and wants. The taxes must provide for 1) even-handedness -- something akin to horizontal
equity,2 2) distributional fairness -- a concept emerging from notions of vertical equity,3 3)
transparency in application so that the populace understands and accepts the tax and the need for
it and 4) collection mechanisms that do not favor some societal groups, especially those with
resources to secure creative tax advisors, over others who lack the resources. Narrow base taxes
– fuel, alcohol, tobacco -- cannot meet these criteria and the broad base taxes currently
applicable – value added, payroll and income – also fail to meet one or more of the criteria.
While specialized taxes like environmental taxes and sin taxes (alcohol, tobacco) serve useful
regulatory functions and may achieve their behavioral objectives in part, they do so primarily by
increasing the cost of engaging in the undesirable behavior and pricing some actors out of the
activity. Using a pricing rather than a direct regulatory mechanism, the specialized taxes change
the conversation from social rejection of the behavior to acceptance as long as the actor is willing
and able to pay the high price. Is it all right to pollute if one pays to do so?4 Direct regulation
might prove less regressive and less likely to be viewed as simply a matter of price and more as a
matter of societal mainstream and commitment to addressing a problem.
1

Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 Saint Louis U. L. J. 47 (2010) (arguing that tax avoidance is
embedded into modern cultures).
2
Compare the formulation of this requirement the German Constitutional Court adopted with respect to the German
income tax: “taxpayers who have the same ability to pay should be taxed equally (horizontal equity), while (in the
vertical direction) taxation of higher incomes should be measured against the taxation of lower incomes.” BVerfGE
107, 27 at 46 (Dec. 4, 2002) (author’s translation as in Henry Ordower, Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation
as Constitutional Principles: Germany and the United States Contrasted, 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 259, 302 (2006)).
3
Id.
4
Consider carbon offsets that might make one feel more comfortable with the personal choice to travel by air.
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To secure sustainable taxation this paper recommends a non-preferential income tax on a
comprehensive income tax base. While by no means a new idea,5 the growing resource
disparity between affluent individuals and individuals with limited resources renders the idea of
a non-preferential income tax on all income including realized and unrealized gains all the more
compelling. The paper outlines a method for transition to the recommended tax base from the
current realization-based tax base and suggests that in limited cases a taxpayer might defer
payment of tax on some items of income but not defer inclusion of the items in the tax base. As
it describes its tax plan, the paper reflects on the objectives and shortcomings of the targeted
taxes and purposive tax base modifications that have proliferated during the 20th century. The
paper concludes that a non-comprehensive tax base may accomplish narrow objectives
successfully but is unlikely to become functionally sustainable to support essential governmental
goods and services.6 Neither are targeted taxes and purposive tax base modifications fully
justifiable. They are likely to distribute tax burdens unevenly among taxpayers without any
compelling reason for preferring some taxpayers to others. The narrowness of the base of such
taxes frequently leads to regressive tax incidence.
Some taxes serve a predominantly political objective, others a behavioral one. Their
proliferation may target narrow, albeit pressing, issues such as environmental degradation;7
others may support targeted economic development.8 Yet, even carefully crafted, socially
desirable and focused tax choices distract and occasionally misdirect political and social
attention from more durable solutions that may lead to long necessary, broad and sustainable tax
reform. Beneficent tax provisions targeting critical issues often burden those with limited
resources disproportionally relative to the burden on those with greater resources. Even when
Congress chose to make healthcare insurance a substantially universal requirement in the U.S., it
used the tax infrastructure to support that requirement. Individuals who fail to buy health
insurance must make a shared responsibility payment collected through the income tax but not
enforced with penalties for failure to file or pay.9 In National Federation of Independent
5

Henry C. Simons, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION: THE DEFINITION OF INCOME AS A PROBLEM OF FISCAL POLICY at
50 (Chicago, 1938) defines income for purposes of the income tax base as: “the algebraic sum of (1) the market
value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store of property rights between
the beginning and end of the period in question.”
6
The paper will not try to define essential governmental goods and services, but, at a minimum, military, fire and
police protection, courts and a legislature would fall into that category.
7
Ian Parry: Why A Carbon Tax Makes Sense, IMF (2019), available at
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2019/12/the-case-for-carbon-taxation-and-putting-a-price-on-pollutionparry.htm
8
Opportunity zones, for example. Section §1400Z of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”),
Title 26 of the U.S. Code (deferring taxation of capital gain when gain is invested in an qualified opportunity fund
and eliminating capital gain on appreciation of the opportunity fund investment). This article refers to provisions of
the Code by section number as “I.R.C. §” followed by a number. The Code and I.R.C. § also refers to provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, the predecessor to the 1986 codification of the U.S. tax laws.
9
Section §5000A (requiring a payment collected through the income tax infrastructure but amended in 2017 to set
the payment amount at zero). This article refers to provisions of the Code by section number as “I.R.C. §” followed
by a number. The Code and I.R.C. § also refers to provisions of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended,
the predecessor to the 1986 codification of the U.S. tax laws.
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Business v. Sebelius10 the U.S. Supreme Court held the Affordable Care Act to be constitutional
and the payment supporting the healthcare mandate to be a tax despite it applying narrowly only
to those individuals without health insurance. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 reduced the
amount of the payment to zero leaving the tax infrastructure in place but gutting any impact of
the payment.11
As a result targeted taxes undercut their own benefits by violating equality principles as they
become regressive relative to resources. Despite their virtues, such targeted taxes tend to be
unsustainable as a solution even to the narrow problem they address. Often such taxes are used
as a proxy for something else – environmental regulation, for example -- without being the most
direct and certain way to deal with that something else.
Part I of this paper sorts taxes by their objectives, examining how well or poorly they serve their
objective as the paper reviews the incidence of the taxes. Part II addresses the legislative
addiction to using the tax infrastructure and complexity. Part III considers broad tax bases and
observes the shortcomings of existing broad bases in the context of providing sustainability for
taxes. Part IV focuses on favored capital under the income tax and the manner in which the
income tax disfavors labor as capital income and labor income have split and continue to
separate creating into a dual income tax.12 Part V concludes by recommending a sustainable and
transparent income tax that neither perpetuates societal disparities between affluent and nonaffluent individuals nor limits the ability of those without capital to accumulate tax favored
capital.
Part I. Tax sorting and sustainability. While taxes serve primarily to fund public goods and
services, legislatures often use taxes to serve other functions as well. Sometimes those other
functions are free from revenue production goals. Tax systems in developed economies have
substantial administrative infrastructures. Rather than creating a new administrative
infrastructure to regulate an activity, legislatures may and often do rely instead on the existing
tax infrastructure as they regulate or extend subsidies to activities. To fit the regulation or
subsidy into an existing tax system, the tax infrastructure may permit the capture of a tax subsidy
or avoidance of tax burden by unintended taxpayers. Many examples of this phenomenon exist.
The longstanding example of tax exempt bonds described in the next paragraph illustrates the
point.
10

567 U.S. 519 (2012) (holding the Affordable Care Act constitutional). Recently, a lower court decision ruled the
Affordable Care Act unconstitutional after the reduction of the shared responsibility payment to zero eliminating the
healthcare insurance mandate. Abby Goodnough and Robert Pear, Texas Judge Strikes Down Obama’s Affordable
Care Act as Unconstitutional, The New York Times (December 14, 2018), available at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/health/obamacare-unconstitutional-texas-judge.html.
11
Section 11081 of Pub. L. 115–97 (Dec. 22, 2017) amended subsection (c) of I.R.C. §5000A to set the applicable
dollar amount at zero. Pub. L. 115–97 is an unnamed tax act commonly referred to as the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 (TCJA).
12
Edward D. Kleinbard, An American Dual Income Tax: Nordic Precedents, 5 Northwestern Journal of Law and
Social Policy 41 (2010).
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Tax Subsidies. The U.S. subsidizes the borrowing cost of state and local governmental units by
excluding the interest that is paid from the recipient’s income.13 This exclusion from taxation
permits the governmental unit to borrow at a rate lower than it would pay if the interest it paid
were fully taxable to the recipient. While some doubt existed historically as to whether the U.S.
constitutionally could tax the interest, the decision in South Carolina v. Baker14 dispelled any
such lingering doubts. Assuming, for example, that the market interest rate were ten percent and
the maximum income tax rate were 30 percent, the state interest rate should be 7 percent so that
the state captures the tax subsidy from the gross income exclusion. States rarely can find
sufficient buyers for their debt who are 30 percent bracket taxpayers so they must offer a higher
interest rate to attract lower bracket taxpayers. If the state may sell all its debt if it targets 20
percent bracket taxpayers, the interest rate it will pay to make the exempt interest comparable to
the 10 percent market rate is 8 percent. Nothing prevents a lender who does pay the maximum
rate of 30 percent from buying the 8 percent debt and receiving the equivalent of an above
market rate of 11.43 percent. That high bracket taxpayer/lender captures part of the federal
subsidy directed to the state. The U.S. cannot shift the excess tax saving to the state as a subsidy.
Instead it is a deadweight loss that does nothing to advance the U.S. goal of subsidizing states’
borrowing costs. A direct subsidy of an interest rate differential would be more efficient and
would not enhance the resources of wealthier taxpayers who otherwise are taxable at the highest
marginal rates of tax.
An income tax might have a primarily revenue raising function but the legislature often deploys
deductions and exclusions from the income tax base to stimulate the economy rather than
providing direct subsidies that would require their own administrative infrastructure. A simple
example is the depreciation deduction.15 A deduction for gradual consumption of durable
property used to produce income makes sense where the goal of the income tax is to tax only the
taxpayer’s net income. Consumption of the durable property is one of the costs of producing the
income. Determining how much of the durable property is consumed as income is produced
always has been challenging. Mismatching of allowance and economic consumption has been
common and a source of disagreement between the taxpayer and tax collector. In 1981,
Congress stabilized the depreciation allowance system in the U.S. by introducing determinable
useful lives and allowable methods of depreciation and by eliminating salvage value when it
introduced the accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS).16 The depreciation system abandoned
the notion of accurately matching income and expenditure. It substituted a system providing
economic stimulus rather measuring net income.

13

I.R.C. §103 (excluding interest on state and local obligations from the gross income of the recipients).
485 U.S. 505 (1988) (holding U.S. may tax interest on state or local obligation not issued in registered form).
15
I.R.C. §§ 167 and 168.
16
I.R.C. §168, added by the Economic Recovery Act of 1981, P.L. 97-34 (August 13, 1981) Section 201.
14
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In a graduated income tax, deductions17 like ACRS and exclusions like state and local interest
payments benefit higher marginal bracket and generally wealthier taxpayers more than lower
bracket taxpayers. Since adoption of the accelerated cost recovery system of depreciation in
1981, Congress has modified useful lives and permissible methods on several occasions, each
time causing market disruptions as the changed methods affect the initial and resale values of the
underlying durable goods. Shortened lives and acceleration increase value, lengthened lives and
retarded recovery decreases values because of the time value of the deduction. Repeated
revisions of tax provisions affecting property values do not contribute to a predictable and
sustainable system as each modification produces extra-market winners and losers. While
changes in direct subsidies might do so as well, they are likely to target a specific industry. Such
a targeted subsidy is subject to greater public scrutiny than is a general tax change and is more
likely to benefit its target only without providing broader opportunities for tax planners to seize
the benefit for non-targeted taxpayers.
Non-Revenue/Subsidy Functions. Taxes also may serve a primarily non-tax function. Until the
beginning of the 20th century when the income tax amendment to the U.S. Constitution18
permitted a direct income tax without apportionment, tariffs were the principal revenue source
for the federal government.19 While tariffs historically served the function of protecting
American industry by levelling prices for U.S. manufactured goods with the prices that other
countries with lower production costs might offer for comparable goods or making them more
expensive than domestic goods, revenue production often was at least an equally important
function of the tariffs. Import duties20 have begun again to flourish in the U.S., but currently,
rather than a primary or even comparable revenue producing function, new tariffs have been
deployed politically to support American demands for trade concessions from the U.S.’s trading
partners.
During the latter decades of the 20th century, legislatures increasingly relied on existing tax
infrastructures to address issues that are not fundamentally tax or revenue issues. Legislatures
designed some taxes to discourage bad behaviors or encourage good behaviors and other taxes
17

New I.R.C. §199A providing a 20 percent deduction for qualified business income may alter this observation in
some instances, see infra note 85 and accompanying text.
18
U.S. Constitution Amendment XVI (1913) (federal income tax without apportionment otherwise required by U.S.
Const. Art. I, section 2, para. 3 permitted.)
19
In many of the years before 1913, tariffs generated nearly 100 percent of federal revenue. Bureau of the Census,
Bicentennial Edition: Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970, Series Y 352-357, Federal
Government Receipts: 1789-1939 at 1106 (available at
http://www2.census.gov/library/publications/1975/compendia/hist_stats_colonial-1970/hist_stats_colonial-1970p2chY.pdf). Text from footnote 32 in Henry Ordower, Taxing Others in the Age of Trump: Foreigners (and the
Politically Weak) as Tax Subjects, 62 Saint Louis University L.J. 157, 162 (2017).
20
In the U.S. the provisions governing customs duties are in 19 U.S. Code while most other federal taxes appear in,
the Internal Revenue Despite separate codification, customs duties are considered to be taxes on the import of raw
materials and goods. Webster’ New World Dictionary, College Ed. 454 (New York, 1960). Tariffs are taxes or
schedules of duties. Id. at 1491. The words duty and tariff tend to be used interchangeably but the U.S. Constitution
refers to duties but not tariffs. U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 8, para. 1 delegates the power to impose taxes, duties, excises
to Congress.
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(or adjustments to existing taxes) to provide targeted funding for favored projects and
incidentally to withhold funding from disfavored projects. Each tax or adjustment comes with its
own distributional characteristics. Few if any taxes are progressive while many are regressive
relative to wealth or resources of the taxpayer.
A tax on alcoholic beverages is an example of a tax not designed primarily to raise revenue but
to modify undesirable behavior. Rather than prohibiting the behavior,21 the tax increases the cost
to consumers of imbibing alcoholic beverages relative to other consumables. Some consumers
are likely to modify their behavior in response to the tax and purchase less alcohol because they
lack funds to buy or are unwilling to devote so much of their resources to consumption. The tax
can be targeted to discriminate among different types of alcoholic beverages22 depending on the
legislature’s view of the degree of undesirability of the alcohol type.
Except in the unlikely event that data on specific buying preferences of various social or
economic groups in the society might enable a legislature to discriminate against or in favor of
specific groups, an alcohol tax does not distinguish among consumers. Since it is imposed at a
flat rate possibly adjusted by the type of beverage, the tax adversely impacts a consumer with
limited resources more than it does a consumer with abundant resources. The tax is regressive
and is more likely to deter undesirable behavior by those with limited rather than abundant
resources. 23 However, the increased cost of the tax might stress households in which the
individuals are unwilling or unable to modify their behavior and they redirect limited household
resources to alcohol purchase. Where the tax becomes too burdensome for most consumers,
some may seek off market sources of the product that are less expensive. Off market providers
of the products do not collect and pay the tax either because they smuggle the products from a
jurisdiction that does not impose the tax or imposes the tax at a lower rate, they steal the products
or they manufacture the products in or distribute them from unmonitored and possibly higher
health risk facilities as occurred during the period of prohibition in the U.S. Because alcohol is
addictive for some consumers, the tax may be responsible in part for collateral crime, as
individuals seek to raise revenue to buy the product.

21

Compare the failure of prohibition in the U.S. U.S. Const. Amendment XVIII (1919) (prohibition) was repealed
U.S. Const. Amendment XXI (1933).
22
Börje Olsson, Hildigunnur Ólafsdóttir and Robin Room, Introduction: Nordic traditions of studying the impact of
alcohol policies, Table 1. Some features of Nordic alcohol control systems in 2002 in Robin Room, ed. The Effects
Of Nordic Alcohol Policies What Happens To Drinking And Harm When Alcohol Controls Change? NAD
Publication No. 42 (Helsinki 2002) (available at http://www.dldocs.stir.ac.uk/documents/nad42.pdf) (showing tax
differences for differing types of alcoholic beverages).
23
Similarly, cigarette taxes that have limited success in reducing adult smoking but greater effect on children.
Kevin Callison and Robert Kaestner, Do Higher Tobacco Taxes Reduce Adult Smoking? New Evidence of the
Effect of Recent Cigarette Tax Increases on Adult Smoking, NBER Working Paper 18326 (2012) (accessed at
https://www.nber.org/papers/w18326). Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, RAISING CIGARETTE TAXES
REDUCES SMOKING, ESPECIALLY AMONG KIDS (AND THE CIGARETTE COMPANIES KNOW IT)
(accessed at https://www.tobaccofreekids.org/assets/factsheets/0146.pdf).
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An alcoholic beverage tax is not sustainable. If successful in modifying behavior, as it has been
in Scandinavia,24 it produces a diminishing revenue flow and, ideally results in its own
obsolescence as alcohol consumption and possibly alcoholism diminish. It is not a reliable
source of long term revenue to support governmental provision of goods and services and it is
not sustainable because it is regressive.
Similarly, as an alternative to direct regulation of pollutants and polluting behaviors, legislatures
have sought to use the tax administrative infrastructure to supplement or replace regulation.
Environmental taxes, alongside direct regulation, hold promise in controlling environmental
degradation but their success so far has been limited. In the U.S., there are both federal and
state fuel taxes.25 Fuel tax increases have some impact on consumption in the U.S. As taxes and
fuel prices rose following the 1973 oil crisis,26 demand increased for vehicles with improved fuel
economy. Yet, abundant and competitive oil production in recent years has stabilized fuel prices
and even caused them to decline as consumers returned to less fuel efficient vehicle options.
Consumers continue to purchase large and fuel inefficient vehicles.
More direct use of the tax infrastructure to regulate fuel consumption and its accompanying
pollution comes in the form of the federal gas guzzler tax that increases the cost of vehicles with
low fuel efficiency ratings.27 Complementing the gas guzzler tax is a temporary credit for initial
sales of electric vehicles. The credit expires when the manufacturer reaches a certain level of
production.28 The tax credit encourages development of electric vehicles. Nevertheless,
alternative fuel efficient vehicles including hybrids that use gasoline and electricity and electric
vehicles have found a limited market. Electric vehicles have remained expensive even when the
manufacturer passes the tax credit subsidy on to the consumer. The vehicles are out of economic
reach for the great bulk of the populace. For others the limited availability of facilities and the
time necessary for charging batteries have undermined broad acceptance of electric vehicles for
those who have the resources to acquire them. Direct fuel efficiency regulation for vehicles has
served as a passive control on fuel consumption alongside increased taxes.
The impact of fuel efficiency standards and tax incentives and disincentives tends to be
regressive relative to resources. Lower income taxpayers often buy the vehicles that higher
income taxpayers relinquish and hold vehicles in service longer than higher income taxpayers
24

Randy W. Elder, PhD, Briana Lawrence, MPH, Aneeqah Ferguson, MPA et al., The Effectiveness of Tax Policy
Interventions for Reducing Excessive Alcohol Consumption and Related Harms, 38 American Journal of Preventive
Medicine 217 (2010) (finding reverse correlation between price and consumption of alcohol but correlation is
weaker as disposable income increases).
25
American Petroleum Institute, State Motor Fuel Taxes: Notes Summary Rates Effective 01/01/2019 (available at
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Statistics/State-Motor-Fuel-Notes-Summary-January-19.pdf) (showing both state
by state rates and combined with federal taxes). States tend to dedicate fuel taxes to road maintenance and
construction.
26
U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian, Oil Embargo, 1973–1974 (available at
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/oil-embargo).
27
I.R.C. §4064 (excise tax on sale my manufacturer of low fuel economy vehicles).
28
I.R.C. §30D (plug-in vehicle credit).
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who can replace their vehicles in favor of better fuel economy so that the lower income taxpayers
bear the heaviest burden of fuel tax increases and general price advances. There have been no
incentives to enable low income individuals to acquire fuel efficient vehicles while for many a
car is essential to enable them to work because of a dearth of practical mass transit options. The
U.S. has been slow to develop affordable and widely available mass transit. Where high
efficiency mass transit becomes available demand for housing near the transit causes housing
prices to rise. Higher housing costs exclude lower income individuals from access to that mass
transit.
Part II. Income tax infrastructure and non-tax purposes. The preceding part of this paper
illustrates the range of purposes for which the legislature has used the tax infrastructure. Rather
than considering delivery of any subsidy directly or controlling undesirable behavior with a
direct enforcement mechanism, Congress automatically seems to turn to the income tax to
deliver the subsidy with an exclusion from tax,29 a deduction30 or a credit31 or deters undesirable
behavior with a tax32 or the denial of a deduction.33 Many people find the income tax to be
complex and intimidating. Some leading scholars have offered thoughtful recommendations to
eliminate part of that complexity by removing the requirement that all taxpayers engage with the
income tax directly. Michael Graetz recommends eliminating the return filing requirement for
most taxpayers.34 Joseph Bankman has been a proponent for initial return preparation by the tax
agency rather than the taxpayer.35 Over the years, politicians have offered proposals to make the
federal income tax return post card sized with only a line or two to fill.36 Rather than
simplification, however, tax legislation tends to make taxing more complex both in its detail and
by adding taxes to address specific revenue, political or social needs. As the number of taxes
grows, it becomes more difficult to determine which taxpayers are paying which taxes and what
their overall tax burden may be. When taxes deliver subsidies, tax planners often misdirect part
of the subsidy to taxpayers who are not the subsidy target.37
Tax-based subsidies for specific investments sacrifice full use of the intended subsidy in the
subsidized activity in exchange for the simplicity of an existing administrative mechanism. Tax
planning generates deadweight loss as the tax planners seize a portion of the subsidy as they
29

I.R.C. §103, supra note 13 and accompanying text (subsidy to state and local governments through exclusion of
interest payments from lenders’ incomes).
30
I.R.C. §168, supra note 16 and accompanying text (accelerated depreciation allowance).
31
I.R.C. §30D, supra note 28 (plug-in vehicle credit).
32
I.R.C. §4064, supra note 27 (gas guzzler excise tax).
33
I.R.C. §280E (denying a deduction for business expenses associated with dealing in controlled substances).
34
100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Simple, Fair, and Competitive Tax Plan for the United States (New Haven,
2010).
35
For example, Joseph Bankman, Simple Filing for Average Citizens: the California Ready Return, 107 Tax Notes
1431 (2005).
36
Richard A. Gephardt (Dem. MO) touted such a return in his unsuccessful presidential campaign of 1988 and the
notion resurfaced in conjunction with the TCJA in 2017, supra note 11.
37
The tax shelter industry in the U.S. exemplifies this phenomenon. Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note
1 at 55.
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structure investments to comply with tax subsidy requirements while possibly not embracing the
underlying objective of the subsidy.38 Recently when New York City required that new
residential developments have a specific portion of lower income, “affordable” rental units as a
condition to receiving certain tax benefits, some developers designed the project with separate
entrances and facilities to segregate the low income tenants from the market rate tenants to make
the higher market rental units more desirable, New York City changed the tax subsidy law to
prohibit the practice prospectively.39
III. Broad tax bases for a sustainable tax. A modern government cannot collect all its revenue
from its wealthiest taxpayers even if it were committed to redistribution under progressive taxes.
As Professor Sven-Olof Lodin argued in 1977, with only some ten percent of the population in
1973 earning income greater than SEK 40,000,40 the bulk of government revenue must come
from lower and moderate income groups.41 Professor Lodin concluded that the form of tax used
to raise the revenue from the low to moderate income population might be of no significance.42
Lodin acknowledged, however, that “the heavy taxation of the low-income-receivers would
probably not have been psychologically possible if the taxation of the higher incomes had not
been made even more severe.”43 Consistent with that view of the necessity of taxing high
incomes severely was the commonly held view through much of the 20th century that the tax
system should not favor income from capital over income from labor.44 The image of “the idle
rich” was commonplace. Estate or inheritance taxes enjoyed some, albeit limited, success in
preventing the accumulation and transmission of vast, dynastic, accumulated wealth although
increasingly aggressive tax planning undercut the effectiveness of those taxes.45
Much has changed both in Sweden and the U.S. since that time. Capital and its owners have
captured tax legislation. Any negative image of the “idle rich” as exploiters of labor transmuted

38

Klaus-Dieter Drüen, Unternehmerfreiheit und Steuerumgehung [Entrepreneurial Freedom and Tax Avoidance],
2008 Steuer Und Wirtschaft [STUW] 154, 158, observed: "Steuerumgehung volkswirtschaftlich betrachtet den
Wettbewerb und führt zur ineffizienten Allokation von Ressourcen, weil beträchtliches Personal in Unternehmen,
Steuerberatung und Staat fern von wirtschaftlicher Nutzenmaximierung gebunden wird.") ["From an economic
perspective, tax avoidance disrupts competition and leads to inefficient allocation of resources as considerable
personnel in business, tax planning industries, and the state remain far from economic production maximization
activity." (author's translation).
39
Melkorka Licea, ‘Poor door’ tenants of luxury tower reveal the financial apartheid within, The New York Post
(January 17, 2016), accessed at https://nypost.com/2016/01/17/poor-door-tenants-reveal-luxury-towers-financialapartheid/.
40
Sven-Olof Lodin, Swedish Tax Reforms 1071-77 – Why So Many?, 56 Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis Studia
Juridica Stockholmiensia 181-2 (1977).
41
Id. at 183.
42
Id. Lodin’s study mentions the role employer taxes play in the adjustment of income tax rates but neither
identifies the inverse relationship between employer taxes and wages nor the distributional effects of increasing
value added taxes.
43
Id.
44
Andrew W. Mellon, TAXATION: THE PEOPLE’S BUSINESS 56-8 (New York 1924).
45
Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 1 at 69-70.
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to a myth.46 The wealthy have transformed into job creators and assumed the role of the drivers
of production and growth. Without the productive wealthy members of society, the country
would not thrive.47 That argument has favored reducing regulatory and tax burdens on the
wealthy to enable them to use their resources more effectively to create jobs and stimulate
economic growth. Simultaneously, capital mobility has undercut any lingering commitment to
taxing labor more lightly than capital. Labor is relatively immobile and easy to tax. National
borders, family ties, cultural barriers and costs of relocation have left labor as a fungible,
predictable and measurable tax object. In advanced economies even if existing labor were to
emigrate, immigration demand quickly would replace the lost labor as immigrants from less
affluent countries seek the higher wages in the advanced economies. Robust tax competition
among jurisdictions has fueled a bidding war for capital and made capital difficult to tax.48 Ease
of communication and transportation over large distances through technological improvement
and development of stable legal and financial systems in many previously difficult to access, low
tax jurisdictions have become more attractive to those with the means to move their capital and
sometimes themselves without giving up many of their ties to their home countries.
During the final decades of the 20th and first decades of the 21st centuries, taxes on capital and
capital investment have declined while relationally taxes on labor have increased in the U.S. and
other economically advanced countries, Sweden included. Opportunities to defer or permanently
exclude capital income from taxation abound. Estate, gift and wealth49 taxes have declined or
disappeared.50 Consumption taxes and wage taxes carry larger shares of the governmental
revenue burden. This shift of tax burdens from capital to labor is the focus of this part.
Estate, gift and wealth taxes all historically used progressive tax rates and fell largely on the
wealthy. Gift taxes remain within the control of the donor. If intrusively high, gift taxes interfere
with the normal practice of gift giving from wealthier to less wealthy individuals – ordinary
behavior within families -- potential donors simply may choose not to make gifts. The U.S.
sought to limit the impact of the gift tax on day-to-day small gifts with an annual per donor/per

46

Morgan Stanley Wealth Management, The Myth of the “Idle Rich” (2015), accessed at:
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/myth-of-the-idle-rich (reporting on a survey of ultra-wealthy individuals with
inherited wealth who are productive and altruistic).
47
The theme of Ayn Rand’s novel Atlas Shrugged (1957) (in which the industrialists avenge efforts to regulate them
by dropping out of the society, creating their own, and leaving the rest of the U.S. to decay) seems to prevail.
48
Competition for capital among state and local jurisdictions in the U.S., for example, has magnified the bargaining
power of major industrial interests. Karen Weise, Manny Fernandez and John Eligon, Amazon’s Hard Bargain
Extends Far Beyond New York, The New York Times (March 3, 2019) (accessed at
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/03/technology/amazon-new-york-politicsjobs.html?rref=collection%2Ftimestopic%2FAmazon.com%20Inc.&action=click&contentCollection=business&regi
on=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=3&pgtype=collection).
49
Limited wealth taxes are common in the U.S. at state or local level and imposed on real property and vehicles but
personal property taxes on other property for which there is no government registry have not been successful.
50
Sweden repealed its inheritance tax in 2003 and its wealth tax in 2007. The U.S. had no wealth tax and reduced
the maximum estate tax rate to 35 percent from 70 percent and now taxes estates only in excess of $10 million rather
than the earlier $600,000.
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donee exclusion.51 The primary role of a gift tax remains as a backstop to the estate or
inheritance tax.
Estate and inheritance taxes are more difficult to avoid than gift taxes.52 Death is actuarially
predictable so that the taxes can provide a reasonably steady revenue stream. Exemptions for
some property passing to surviving spouses and dependent children are essential lest families
losing a breadwinner be left without sufficient economic resources so the taxes primarily affect
wealthier taxpayers. With current concentrations of wealth in economically advanced societies,
an estate or inheritance tax might reach most of that concentrated wealth and produce adequate
revenue to fund governmental needs if the tax rates are sufficiently high. Political attacks on the
estate tax have been relentless over the past decades and have included valuation litigation in
several countries resulting in court orders to legislatures to cure valuation deficiencies of the
estate tax.53 In the U.S., wealthy taxpayers, frequently providing “dark money,”54 engage in
extensive publicity to characterize the tax pejoratively as an inherently unfair “death” tax
threatening every taxpayer’s ability to pass a business or farm to his or her heirs. The rhetoric
persuaded many middle and lower income taxpayers to vote against their economic interests and
support repeal of the estate tax even though most never would become subject to the tax.55
Extensive lobbying accompanied the publicity. While not a complete success in the U.S., the
U.S. has reduced the incidence of the tax and Sweden repealed it.56
Incidence of a consumption tax whether as a value added tax, sales tax, turnover tax, or other
manifestation falls largely on middle and lower income taxpayers who consume all or almost all
of their resources to meet their daily expenses. If the tax base includes goods, services and real
and personal property rentals, the consumption tax reaches nearly all the income of low and
moderate income individuals who must consume all their resources. Higher income taxpayers
are likely to save and invest a portion of their resources so that even if there were a broad
financial transactions tax embedded into or complementary to the consumption tax,57 the growth
in resources as investments appreciate in value would not become subject to the consumption

51

I.R.C. §2503 (the annual exclusion of $3000 of gifts per donor/per donee increased to $10,000 and became
inflation adjusted).
52
Charitable testamentary gifts are deductible from the estate in full. I.R.C. §2055. And in blank (case citation), the
decedent avoided inclusion of an automobile in his estate when his will directed his burial in the car so that it did not
pass to anyone and was not taxable as part of the estate.
53
Germany and Sweden.
54
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that restrictions on political
expenditures by organizations is not permissible and the organizations need not disclose their donors). The decision
permits large contributions to organizations for political use without transparency, hence “dark money.”
55
Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 1 at 117.
56
Supra, note 50.
57
See, generally, Leonard E. Burman, William G. Gale, Sarah Gault, Bryan Kim, Jim Nunns, and Steve Rosenthal,
Financial Transaction Taxes in Theory and Practice, 69 Nat’l. Tax J. 171 (2016) (accessed at
https://ntanet.org/NTJ/69/1/ntj-v69n01p171-216-financial-transaction-taxes-theory-practice.pdf?v=%CE%B1).
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tax. Recent efforts in several jurisdictions to enact a financial transactions tax have proven
difficult and industry resistance to the tax strong.58
Consumption taxes for moderate and low income taxpayers are attractive because they are
administratively efficient. They are relatively easy to collect because the vendor or service
provider collects the tax along with payment for the goods or services and remits the tax to the
tax collector.59 A purchaser who lacks liquidity to pay the tax cannot acquire the item taxed.
Unlike income and wealth taxes little or no self-reporting is necessary. The recent U.S. Supreme
Court decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc.60 eliminated much of the self-reporting in state
sales and use taxes in the U.S. by permitting states to require out of state vendors to collect and
remit use taxes on sales to residents of states into which the vendor will ship goods.
Consumption taxes tend to be regressive relative to the taxpayers’ resources. While consumption
taxes raise revenue from the bulk of the population as is essential to sustain government goods
and services,61 the tax leaves concentration of resources and resource growth intact and violates
longstanding principles of distributional fairness in taxation. Some commentators have sought to
design a progressive consumption tax but progression is narrow affecting only those who
consume goods and services subject to a consumption tax and not those who consume little
relative to their resources but have stores of wealth. Proposals for a progressive consumption tax
seek to promote savings – a worthy objective for middle and moderate income taxpayers -- but
an objective that has led to concentration of wealth rather than taxation based on any ability to
pay principle. Consumption taxes meet some but not all sustainability criteria and do not offer
sustainable taxation.
The income tax also has a broad base and the potential to raise adequate revenue for government
alone or in conjunction with other taxes. Existing income taxes lack the collection efficiency of
consumption taxes because they often rely heavily on self-reporting except as they apply to wage
earners where withholding provides comparable third party collection and remittance.62 For low,
moderate, and many other middle income taxpayers, wages are the taxpayer’s primary source of
income. For those taxpayers, withholding is effective to collect the income tax. For selfemployed taxpayers and taxpayers with significant income from investment capital, withholding
misses the mark but could be made more robust. By substituting a withholding obligation for
58

For example, Tim Worstall, How Many Times Must We Say This? A Financial Transactions Tax Raises No
Revenue, Forbes (Aug 28, 2017), accessed at https://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2017/08/28/how-manytimes-must-we-say-this-a-financial-transactions-tax-raises-no-revenue/#634d61291a7b.
59
Considerable tax fraud is present even within value added taxes. Richard Thompson Ainsworth, Carousel Fraud
in the EU: A Digital Vat Solution, TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL 443 (MAY 1, 2006). Kiel Institute for World
Economy, The EU Runs a Large Trade Surplus with Itself – One Reason Is Apparently Large-Scale VAT Fraud,
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL (January 9, 2020) available at https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-todayinternational/value-added-tax/german-research-institute-analysis-notes-eu-vatfraud/2020/01/08/2brj9?highlight=vat%20fraud.
60
585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080; 201 L. Ed. 2d 403 (2018).
61
Lodin, Swedish Tax Reforms, supra note 40.
62
I.R.C. §3402 (withholding on wages at source). I.R.C. §31 (credit for wage withholding).
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existing information reporting,63 an income tax could approximate the third party collection
efficiency of a consumption tax.
Most jurisdictions overlay income taxes with a consumption tax64 and often with specialty
taxes65 and taxes on parts of taxpayer wealth.66 Taxes on capital, income from capital and
increases in the value of capital have remained stagnant or moderated as taxes disproportionally
affecting middle, moderate and low income taxpayers proliferate. This recurring theme of
shifting tax burdens from capital to labor seems unlikely to remain sustainable as it segregates
those with accumulated wealth from those with little or no capital. The standard of living in
advanced economies for the bulk of the population has improved over the centuries but the hope
of becoming wealthy may be less attainable than it was when capital was not so concentrated. A
tax system that supports concentrating wealth is distributionally unsustainable especially in the
absence of a strong welfare state that provides some redistribution of wealth through extensive
governmental benefits even if only within income classes.67
U.S. distribution of tax burdens under the income taxe skews in favor of higher income taxpayers
relative to the mid-20th century income tax. Capital gain continues to enjoy favored treatment.68
In the 1960s, for example, the maximum rate of tax on ordinary income was seventy percent.69
Congress assumed that the high rate of tax led many highly compensated and self-employed
individuals to seek investment opportunities generating deductible tax losses.70 The investments
were commonly referred to and marketed as “tax shelters.” In early years of the investment, tax
shelters generated deductible losses taxpayers could use to offset their income from performance
of services and reduce their current tax burden. Shelters generally offered tax deferrals rather
than exclusions. After a number of years the tax shelters would produce taxable income without
cash with which to pay the tax, but the taxpayer could invest and retain the earnings on the
63

I.R.C. §6401(payments in excess of $600); I.R.C. §6041A (wages and payments for services; I.R.C. §6042
(dividends); I.R.C. §6045 (brokers); I.R.C. §6049 (interest).
64
Imposed at state and local level in the U.S. by most states.
65
Alcoholic beverages, tobacco, gasoline, for example.
66
State or local property taxes in the U.S.
67
A common characterization of Scandinavian welfare systems.
68
This paper refers to capital gain imprecisely. A capital gain is gain from the sale or exchange of any capital asset
as defined under I.R.C. §1221 to include all property not within one of the exceptions in I.R.C. §1221. Net capital
gain under I.R.C. §1222(11) is the income which receives favorable treatment. Historically, non-corporate
taxpayers received a deduction for fifty or sixty percent of their net capital gains but currently net capital gains are
taxed at a lower rate than other income for most taxpayers under I.R.C. §1(h). Net capital gain is the excess of net
long term capital gain (I.R.C. §1222(7)) over net short term capital loss (I.R.C. §1222(6)). Net long term capital
gain is long term capital gains (I.R.C. §1222(3)) less long term capital losses (I.R.C. §1222(4)) during a year with
long term meaning that the taxpayer has held the property for more than one year before selling it. Other capital
gains are short term so net short term capital loss is short term capital losses (I.R.C. §1222(2)) – short term capital
gains (I.R.C. §1222(1)).
69
I.R.C. §1, as in effect until 1970.
70
Decreasing rates of tax have not staunched taxpayers’ urge to avoid taxes. Many designer tax shelters of the
1980s and 1990s like the “son-of-boss” transactions sought to avoid payment of favored capital gain. A presidential
candidate John Edwards is representative of taxpayers who sought to avoid a 2.9 percent Medicare tax on income
from services. Ordower, Culture of Tax Avoidance, supra note 1 at 82-8.
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deferred tax liability generated in the early investment years.71 In 1969 Congress reduced the
maximum rate of tax on income from services to fifty percent while retaining a seventy percent
rate maximum for investment income.72 The rate split favoring income from services reduced
tax shelter investments somewhat since a tax shelter would defer fifty percent tax but would
require a payment of seventy percent tax when the shelter began to produce taxable income.73
In 1981, however, Congress eliminated the rate split by reducing the maximum rate on
investment income to fifty percent.74 A further maximum rate reduction in 1987 to 28 percent75
included the short-lived elimination of a rate preference for capital gain. High income taxpayers
with significant income from invested capital experienced a maximum rate reduction of 42
percent with an eight percent increase in the tax on their capital gains. With many ways to
control the timing of the inclusion of capital gains in income, the rate reductions benefitted
higher income taxpayers significantly. Maximum rates have increased and the maximum rate on
capital gain decreased since 1986.
The second portion of the income tax is separate from the general computation of taxable income
and affects only income from the performance of services. The social security tax and its
complementary self-employment tax have their origins in the social security retirement
program.76 Collection of retirement benefits under social security requires that the individual has
paid social security taxes rather than falling into one of the exempt categories of workers.77
There is no immediate correlation between tax payments and the amount and duration of the
benefits. The tax is a wage income tax and its collections become part of general revenue
through a system of internal accounting transfers credited with interest. The tax has only two
rate brackets, a positive rate and a zero rate.78 The positive rate applies to services income up to
a limit.79 Service income in excess of that limit is not subject to the tax nor is income from
capital. Thus the tax favors higher income taxpayers and all taxpayers to the extent of their
income from capital and most who own significant sums of income producing capital are
affluent. Relative to resources the tax is regressive and distributionally not sustainable.

71

Id. at .
Lawrence B. Lindsey, Is the Maximum Tax on Earned Income Effective?, NBER Working Paper No. 613 (1981)
(accessed at https://www.nber.org/papers/w0613.pdf ) (arguing that the split tax leaves much earned income taxable
at the same rates as investment income). When a shelter burned out and began producing income without cash,
many investors simply failed to report the income.
73
Emil Sunley, “The Maximum Tax on Earned Income,” 27 Nat’l. Tax J. 543 (1974). Traditional tax shelter
investments did not lose their attractiveness until many years later when the maximum income tax rate declined to
28 percent and the passive activity loss limitations under I.R.C. §469, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA
86), required matching of tax deductible losses to economic losses.
74
Economic Recovery Act of 1981, supra note 16.
75
Tax Reform Act of 1986, P.L. 99-514 (Oct 22, 1986). Be.cause of a phase out of the marginal rate brackets at
higher income levels by adding an additional tax, there was a 33 percent rate bubble within a specific income range.
76
SSA, RETIREMENT BENEFITS available at https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/EN-05-10035.pdf
77
I.R.C. §3121(b) excludes certain employment such as federal judges, the president and vice president.
78
I.R.C. §3101 (wage tax); I.R.C. §1401 (self-employment tax).
79
The cap on the tax is set under section 230 of the Social Security Act and for 2020 is $137,700.
72
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Performing services as an employee is a trade or business.80 Yet, the tax law disfavors employee
business expenses relative to other business expenses. It excludes employee business expenses
from classification as deductible adjustments to gross income.81 Instead employee business
expenses are itemized deductions82 and miscellaneous itemized deductions83 subject to two
limitations on deductibility. As miscellaneous itemized deductions, they are not deductible until
2026. When they become deductible, they are itemized deduction if they exceed two percent of
the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income.84 As itemized deductions, they produce a tax benefit only
if the taxpayer’s itemized deductions in the aggregate exceed the standard deduction.
Further discriminating against labor relative to capital intensive businesses and some selfemployment is the new twenty percent deduction for qualified business income.85 The trade or
business of performing services as an employee is expressly excluded from the deduction.86
Part IV. The Capital Conundrum.
Income from capital including both periodic income such as interest, dividends, rents, and
royalties, and gain from the disposition of property is not subject to the social security portion of
the income tax.87 In several respects U.S. tax law further favors each type of income from
capital.
Periodic Income. Since 2001 dividends from domestic corporations are subject to a reduced rate
of tax.88 The reduced rate ameliorates the impact of a shareholder level tax following on a
corporate level tax often referred to as double taxation of corporate profits. The recent reduction
in the corporate tax rate to 21 percent89 undercuts that double taxation argument in that currently
the combined tax on a corporation distributing all its after tax income to non-corporate
shareholders is currently lower than the maximum rate of tax on income from other sources
including specified service business income.90 Income from an unincorporated, capital intensive
trade or business yields a twenty percent deduction for qualified business income.91 To the
extent a business places depreciable personal property into service, it receives an immediate
80

I.R.C. §62(a)(1).
Id. Generally referred to as above-the-line deductions that always produce a tax benefit.
82
I.R.C. §63.
83
I.R.C. §67. Suspension of deduction. I.R.C. §67(g).
84
I.R.C. §62.
85
I.R.C. §199A added by the TCJA, supra note 11. I.R.C. §199A(d)(1)(A) (excludes specified service business
income from professional services (medicine, law, architecture, accounting, etc.) in excess of certain thresholds).
86
I.R.C. §199A(d)(1) (B).
87
Supra note 78, a 12.4 percent tax on gross wages and self-employment income with a cap.
88
I.R.C. §1(h)(11) (imposing a maximum rate of 20 percent). The statement oversimplifies the rate preference. The
rate preference applies to foreign corporations that have U.S. source income. In addition corporate shareholders
receiving dividends from other corporations may deduct some or the entire amount of the dividend. I.R.C. §243,
245A.
89
I.R.C. §11, as amended by TCJA.
90
That is 21 percent corporate tax followed by a 20 percent individual tax on the 79 percent remaining -- a total of
36.8 percent. I.R.C. §199A(d)(1)(A), supra note 85, legal services, for example.
91
I.R.C. §199A.
81
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deduction for the cost of the depreciable property under the current bonus depreciation rules92 – a
significant timing advantage over other depreciation methods.
Capital Gain. The U.S. income tax gives capital gain a position of privilege and protection that it
has enjoyed consistently and, except for that brief period after 1986, a preferred rate structure.93
Even that period when the maximum rate applicable to capital gain was equal to that applicable
to other income, the realization requirement for inclusion of capital gain in income94 left the
timing of inclusion within the control of the taxpayer while income from services was periodic
and immediately includable. Capital can be preserved and increased without significant
interference from tax but taxes retard the initial accumulation for those without capital by
diminishing net disposable income from services that one might invest in capital.
One powerful privilege of capital is that appreciated property which would generate capital gain
if sold during a taxpayer’s lifetime95 is no longer taxable, except to the extent of post-death
appreciation in value, if sold following the taxpayer’s death. This disappearance of capital gain
occurs because the decedent’s adjusted basis in all the decedent’s property changes to the fair
market value of the property on the date of the decedent’s death.96 This new adjusted basis at
death rule motivates taxpayers to continue to hold property to get the new basis at death for the
beneficiaries of their estates longer than they otherwise might do when, absent taxes, holding the
property may not be the best economic choice for the property. Instead of selling. taxpayers may
monetize their property through borrowing secured by the property. Borrowing is not a taxable
event.
Congress may have assumed that a preferential tax rate for capital gain would encourage
taxpayers to sell when economically desirable to shift the property to its most productive use.
Similarly, other special capital rules enable taxpayers to transfer property without incurring any
incidence of taxation on the transfer.97 In some deferrals the property may be shifted to more
productive use while gifts shift the incidence of capital gain taxation to the donee from the donor
under whose ownership the property appreciated in value. While shifting of income from capital

92

I.R.C. §168(k)(1) (allowing a 100 percent depreciation allowance for most personal property until 2024 and then
phase down to 80 percent, etc.).
93
Supra note 75 and accompanying text.
94
I.R.C. §1001.
95
I.R.C. §1011 (adjusted basis is cost under I.R.C. §1012 plus or minus adjustments under I.R.C. §1016
(depreciation allowances, for example)). If a taxpayer’s amount realized (sale price) on the sale or exchange of
property exceeds the taxpayer’s adjusted basis in the property, the excess is gain. I.R.C. §1001. Gain is includable
in income unless a statute otherwise prevents inclusion. I.R.C. §1001(c).
96
The excess of the amount realized over adjusted basis becomes zero as the adjusted basis becomes fair market
value on date of death. I.R.C. §1014.
97
I.R.C. §1031 (like kind exchange of real property); I.R.C. §351 (transfer to a controlled corporation); I.R.C. §721
(transfer to a partnership); I.R.C. §1015 (transfer by gift).
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and capital gain to another taxpayer subject to a lower tax rate, for example, through a gift of the
property is permitted,98 shifting income from the performance of services is not.99
Charitable gifts of property over which the donor may retain limited but indirect control do not
trigger the recognition of gain from the disposition of the property.100 Yet, the donor receives a
deduction for the charitable gift equal to the fair market value of the property on the date of the
gift.101 The deduction reduces the donor’s taxable income from other sources by the value of the
donated property. The resulting tax reduction is a tax-based subsidy of the charitable gift and the
donor controls the expenditure of that amount of governmental revenue free from any
governmental policy decision on expenditures. The redirection of government revenue through
the tax deduction may be fully contrary to current government expenditure policies but
nevertheless available as long as the charitable donee meets the very general charitable recipient
requirements.102 An individual without capital also may make deductible charitable
contributions but in most cases of lower, moderate and middle income taxpayers, the charitable
contribution deduction results in little or no tax savings because it generates a tax benefit only
when the donor’s itemized deductions,103 including the charitable contribution deduction, exceed
the standard deduction.104 Few taxpayers itemize deductions.
The ability to defer inclusion of capital asset appreciation in income and the rate preference
applicable to capital gain encourage extensive tax planning to convert what might be ordinary
income into capital gain. Congress repeatedly has enacted legislation to prevent conversion. For
example, depreciation allowances on personal property are subject to recapture as ordinary
income when the taxpayer disposes of the personal property.105 Nevertheless a much criticized
opportunity to convert services income into capital gain remains available in the private equity

98

The donor does not recognize gain from transferring property by gift. See infra note 100. The donee does not
have income from the gift under I.R.C. §102 but does succeed to the donor’s adjusted basis in the property received.
I.R.C. §1015 and built-in gain potential.
99
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (holding that an assignment of income from services from one spouse to the
other would not be valid for tax purposes). Joint return filing rendered the issue moot by permitting general splitting
of income between spouses. I.R.C. §6013.
100
No specific statutory authority exists for this proposition or for the non-recognition of gain by the donor of a noncharitable gift. Under the gain inclusion provision I.R.C. §1001, there is a disposition but the amount the donor
realizes from the disposition is zero so that the donor’s adjusted basis always will be greater than or equal to the
amount realized and theoretically would have a non-deductible loss under I.R.C. §165(c) (no deductible loss if the
transaction was neither in a trade or business nor a transaction entered into for profit). The donee succeeds to the
donor’s adjusted basis so any built-in gain is preserved for recognition when the donee sells the property. Sale by a
charitable donee will not become taxable because the donee is exempt from tax. I.R.C. §501.
101
I.R.C. §170.
102
I.R.C. §501(c)(3) (charitable purposes for organizations exempt from tax and permitted to receive deductible
contributions including churches, educational institutions, civic groups among others).
103
I.R.C. §63(d).
104
I.R.C. §63(c) (an inflation adjusted $12,000 per taxpayer).
105
I.R.C. §1245.
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and to a lesser degree hedge fund industries,106 as investment managers receive a share of the
profits of the fund in the form of an interest in the investment fund entity. This “carried interest”
is not taxable when received107 but as the manager receives a share of the profits, the tax
transparency rules preserve the character of the income of the entity in the hands of the
partners.108 In the case of a private equity fund, the income tends to be capital gain from the sale
of the acquired corporate business.
Changing the Base and the Conversation. Why favor capital? Capital receives favorable income
tax treatment in many ways: deductions, rates, and timing. Deductions and rates both go to the
question of how much and timing goes to when and if.109 Elimination of both rate preferences
and deferral would broaden the tax base considerably, generate the same revenue at lower
marginal rates and would have a comparatively small impact on taxpayers with little property.
Favorable treatment of capital gain when includable in income along with the ability of taxpayers
to defer recognizing capital gains severely hampers the development of a comprehensive tax
base.110
The rate preference for capital gain is a mainstay of the U.S. tax system. The rate preference at
one time may have ameliorated the effect of very high progressive tax rates on concentrated
income.111 Current income tax rates have retreated considerably.112 Yet the preference for
capital gain has endured and expanded to other income from capital.113 Professor Blum
concluded in 1957 that the rate preference was unjustified as he cataloged the arguments.114 The
validity of Blum’s arguments remains compelling. The rate preference is not supportable under
a sustainable tax system. Income is income and the rate preference for capital discriminates
against those who have little or no capital. Inertia and political influence supported by the threat
posed by capital mobility best explain the continuation of the capital gain preference.115
Arguments that reduced rates on capital gain prevent capital flight remain overstated. Evidence
has been to the contrary. Concealment of capital offshore116 and expatriation to avoid taxes117 as
well as corporate inversions to avoid the U.S. taxation of worldwide income118 seem unlikely to
106

Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 NYU Law Rev.
(2008), accessed at https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-83-1Fleischer.pdf.
107
Rev. Proc. 93-27, 1993-27 C.B. 343.
108
I.R.C. §702(b) (character and source of partnership allocations flow through to partners).
109
See discussion of I.R.C. §1014 and new basis, supra, note 96 and accompanying text.
110
Simons, Personal Income Taxation, supra note 5, at 50.
111
Walter J. Blum, A Handy Summary of Capital Gains Arguments, 35 Taxes 247. 260 (1957).
112
The maximum tax rate in the 1950s was 91 percent.
113
Supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
114
Blum, Handy Summary, supra note 111.
115
Id. at 266.
116
The Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act has enjoyed some success in compelling U.S. taxpayers to report their
offshore accounts.
117
I.R.C. §877A (expatriation tax) includes all deferred gain and capital appreciation in income at the moment of
expatriation.
118
I.R.C. §7874 (continuation tax on expatriated entities).
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stop even with rate reductions.119 There is little or no evidence that rate reduction correlates with
job creation and a better economic life for all.
Rate preferences for capital are only one aspect of the capital preference. Elimination of the
ability to escape tax on accumulated appreciation at death also is critical. Whatever assumptions
one once made about lack of records to support new basis at death rules no longer are valid.
With respect to securities, brokers now are required to retain basis records for their clients.120
There no longer is a general rollover for personal residences121 so taxpayers selling a personal
residence must report their gain when they sell and may exclude part of the gain but must have
retained their records.122
Better would be the annual inclusion of appreciation and deduction of depreciation in the value
of each taxpayer’s property. Purging the realization requirement would yield a comprehensive
income tax base and serve as a more complete measure of each taxpayer’s income.123 Valuation
problems abound but not for property with an active trading market. For other intangible
investment property, self-interest of fund managers124 has developed reasonably accurate
techniques for evaluating securities for which no trading market exists. Data bases exist
throughout the U.S. for real property values to facilitate assessment of ad valorem property
taxation at local level. Improvement and consolidation of those data bases and annual updates
would not be a formidable task given advances in computer technology. For other property,
large data base management would become necessary but, once developed, a data base should be
relatively straightforward to adjust for value changes.125 Certainly some income still would be
excluded from the base although including imputed income from an owner’s use of her personal
residence easily could become the next step in taxing capital once a national data base is in
place.126
The recently enacted transition tax127 offers good insights into making the transition to a
comprehensive base palatable. Averaging the inclusion over several years, temporarily reducing
the tax rate, and deferring payment in appropriate circumstances until an actual sale yields
proceeds with which to pay the tax would all ease the transition to non-realization based
119

The reduction of the corporate tax rate from 35 to 21 percent in 2018, I.R.C. §11, as amended by TCJA, and the
corporate dividends received deduction for foreign source income of a foreign subsidiary may reduce the push for
corporate inversions. However, the combination of the base erosion tax under I.R.C. §59A and the inclusion of
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taxation.128 The transition tax also dispels any lingering doubts concerning realization as a
constitutional requirement as it follows on an uneven flow of income without realization statutes,
foreign personal holding companies,129 mark-to-market for certain investment property,130
positions held by securities dealers,131 expatriation as a taxable event,132 but approaches the facts
of the Eisner v. Macomber133decision that required realization as a condition to inclusion in
taxable income.
Part V. Conclusion -- A single sustainable income tax. Following transition to this
comprehensive tax base, integration of the three separate elements of the income tax into a single
tax is the final step. The comprehensive base and elimination of rate preferences integrates
taxation of capital with taxation of other income. The social security tax is the third element.
Continuation of separate base for the social security tax no longer remains compelling. There is
precedent for grafting what once was a wage tax onto a much broader base to include investment
income when revenue was needed to fund a more comprehensive health insurance system.134
Following that restructuring, integration of the three elements would simplify the income tax
greatly, make the income tax treatment of all taxpayers comparable and even-handed, and treat
all income equally for all purposes. Even if the transition were accompanied by further
flattening of rates,135 use of a single base would be simpler, distributionally fairer and more
transparent than the existing income tax. The tax would meet all the requirements for
sustainability and would remain sustainable once established if the legislature would use the tax
infrastructure only for revenue purposes and create a new and transparent administrative
infrastructure to deliver subsidies and advance non-revenue related policies.
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